EU Commission on Auditor Liabilities

EU Commission on Auditor Liabilities Auditors are increasingly finding that they are being targeted by those who feel that they have been wronged by the quality of the financial accounts. Auditors are required to consider the financial accounts that are prepared by the company and to establish whether they believe that they give a true and fair representation of the underlying financial position. By ‘true’ they are looking for whether the transaction actually occurred and by ‘fair’ they are looking to ascertain whether the value of the transaction has been accurately recorded. In the UK, there is a rule that liability for misstatement is joint and several between wrongdoers. This often results in auditors taking a much greater portion of the liability than would seem just. Auditors are often seen to have deep pockets due to their insurance policies and, as such, make more promising targets for those who believe that they have lost out financially due to the inaccuracy of the accounts[1]. Background to the EU Consultation on Auditor Liability There have been widespread concerns over this practice, with many countries operating a more proportional approach where the extent of the blame dictates the extent of the liability. The European Union has shown particular concern over the potential reduction in competition that this lack of capped liability leads to. With the limit level of professional insurance policies playing a huge role in the company’s decision as to which auditor to appoint, this is thought to favour the larger auditors and exclude the smaller players from some of the larger lucrative contracts. It is also thought that this requirement presents such a great barrier to entry for auditor firms that there is a real danger that the audit market is not operating competitively. The EU consultation undertook a study based on four possible options that were available to produce a cap for auditor liability. Firstly, they considered a monetary cap on a Europe wide basis. Secondly, they considered a monetary cap based on the size of the auditor firm. Thirdly, there was an option to produce a monetary cap based on a multiple of the audit fee and finally, they considered the option of member states entering into a policy of proportionate liability, which would require the courts to split the liability based on the level of responsibility for the breach and on a proportional basis. This could either be achieved through statutory provisions or through the contractual provision between the company and the auditor. Upon consultation, the commissioners found that there was overwhelming support for the concept of having a cap on auditor liability, both from inside and outside the auditing profession. The Commission noted that the issue of auditor liability was not a new one, with consideration having been given, in 2001, to whether the extent of the differences between the countries in relation to auditor liability would prevent a single market across Europe. Although, at this stage, the substantial differences across jurisdictions were recognised, they were not thought to be so large that anything had to be done to rectify the position. However, since 2002, the large scale collapse of Arthur Andersen has occurred, bringing the issue of potential liability caps back into the forefront. The Commission initially identified the potential problems that the current auditing regime causes in terms of market stability and competition within the auditing function. Considerable attention was paid to the issue of public interest and the need to have a stable auditing function which can be relied upon to be accurate. For an auditing function to be efficient, the company must be able to select an appropriate auditor for its business needs but still allow it to maintain the independence of the function so that the stakeholders can rely on the statements. It is accepted that auditors will not always be 100% accurate; however, they should be able to be relied upon as this is critical to the overall efficiency of the European capital markets. Concentration of the Audit Market The central importance of the auditing profession is not disputed, with investors relying on the financial statements in order to make investment decisions. However, the magnitude of the risk that auditors are exposed to is becoming increasingly worrying both for the auditors and for the general competitive landscape. Due to the nature of internationally listed companies, there are only four companies that are capable of providing the necessary auditing services. These are refereed to as the ‘Big Four’: Deloitte, KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers and Ernst Young. It is not necessarily the expertise that prevents others entering the market, but rather the high level of professional indemnity that is required which is simply not cost effective for smaller firms entering the market. It is recognised that there is little or no chance of a new entrant into the market, yet there is a danger that any one of the four could be forced out of the market, at any point, thus further re ducing the competition in large scale auditing. In reality, international auditing firms are not actually one large firm but are a network of smaller firms that recognise they are not able to manage the level of risk that is required for international auditing. With strict rules relating to auditing firms, it is unlikely that another network will emerge, making the international audit market particularly fragile[2]. Auditors often become the target in cases of insolvency as they are the ones with the resources available to deal with any financial losses due to misstatement. It is this potential redress that offers investors a degree of confidence in the market and, therefore, it is seen as desirable that auditors are held to be liable in situations where they get it wrong. However, it is recognised that the current joint and several approach is simply inefficient and consideration should be given to alternatives. For the auditing profession to be truly efficient, it is necessary for there to be a substantial degree of choice. This is not currently the case and effort should be made to ensure that the auditing options are widened so as to become accessible to other medium sized firms. One of the recognised ways of doing this is to have a liability cap or a proportionate regime so that the deep pocket syndrome does not restrict the choice of auditor to the hands of the big four[3]. Extent of Risk for an Auditor The major barriers for mid sized auditor firms are recognised as being the lack of available indemnity insurance and the large amount of potential risk that is involved when auditing large international firms. Clearly, an auditor has a duty towards the company itself, based on either contract or tort when it has behaved negligently or with wilful misconduct. The vast majority of cases are related to negligence and it is this area of liability that has generated the most interest from the European Commission[4]. Liability is clearly owed to the client itself; however, this has also extended to be liability towards third parties, causing further barriers to entry for mid sized auditing firms. For a third party to bring a claim, it is necessary for there to be a causation link between the act of negligence and the damages suffered by the third party which, although difficult to prove, has resulted in some high profile payouts further jeopardising the chances of mid tier firms entering the international auditing market[5]. At the heart of this widespread liability is the concept of joint and several liability. Under this process, a third party who has a claim against a director can also bring a claim against an auditor who has given an unqualified opinion as to the accuracy of the accounts. In a case of corporate insolvency, the directors rarely have any finances available to pay out third party losses, therefore, encouraging actions against the auditors who are seen to have ample financial backing. It is this high level of risk that the cap on liability is aiming to address. Oppositions to an Auditors’ Liability Cap Despite the overall acceptance of the need to do something to alter the balance of power within the international auditing market, one of the main objections was that placing a limit on liability would give the auditing profession a privileged position in comparison to other professions. A main aim of establishing a cap was to encourage mid sized firms to enter into the market and it is feared that a liability simply would not achieve this aim. Much of the exposure faced is outside of the EU (i.e. in the US)[6] and, therefore, the cap would make little or no difference. Equally, the insurance requirements would remain high. A cap would not make the insurance requirement less; it would simply make it more ascertainable. There are also concerns that the cap would encourage poor performances and weaker audits. From a competitive point of view, those in opposition to the cap were concerned that such a move would reduce the competitive position of European companies in comparison to other international jurisdictions where no such cap exists. Concerns were also raised that a cap on auditors’ liability would be contrary to the overall proposition of better regulation that the EU has been working towards, in recent years[7]. Alternative Options As it is accepted that the main reason for imposing such a cap would be to open up the international auditing market to other mid sized auditing firms; alternatives to a cap on liability were also considered by the EU because of the potentially negative competitive impact of such caps. One of the possible options is to impose a compulsory insurance on audit firms. There is currently an insurance gap where the amount that an insurer is prepared to insure an auditor for is substantially less than the potential liability. Forcing the auditor to take out insurance to cover all losses would not be practicable due to the high level of potential risk. Therefore, the premiums would be prohibitively expensive, particularly for the smaller firms. Alternatives to funding this additional insurance would have to come from investors or the companies themselves. Another approach would be to reduce the potential risk faced by auditors by introducing safe harbours. This would involve carving out certain areas from the potential liability of the auditor such as any external reviewers’ comments on the company or any future plans which have happened after the end of the financial accounting year. However, in doing this, there are fears that the underlying principle of professional judgment would be eroded in favour of formalised approaches to ensuring that as much of the safe harbour carve out could be enjoyed. EU Recommendations On considering all of these factors and a widespread discussion of the pros and cons of the possibility of a cap on auditors’ liability, the EU commission has established a proposal that aims to achieve the middle ground[8]. When considering the four options as stated above (cap for all European audits, cap based on size of audit firm, cap based on the fee and a proportionate regime), the EU Commission concluded that a combination of a proportionate liability and an auditors’ cap on liability would make the foundations of their recommendations. The report advised member states to require a limitation to auditors’ liability to be established either through a statutory cap, a limitation based on proportionality or limitation of liability through the contract between the audit company and the auditor. Proportional liability gained considerable support from the non-auditing respondents to the proposals as it was felt that this would deal with the issue of reliance on auditors’ deep pockets, but would also ensure that the quality of the audit would be maintained. The commission recommended that any member state implementing this approach should not set a specific proportion and should simply set the principle in place to be applied through the judicial processes, where necessary. Unsurprisingly, the auditing profession preferred the concept of a cap on liability, arguing that it would have no long term impact on the quality of the audit and would allow mid sized firms to enter the market. This was not entirely followed by the EU Commission who preferred to suggest a principle of proportionate liability. Based on all arguments, the EU Commission has advised a regime of proportionate liability across all member states. Conclusions The issue of auditors’ liability and how risk is apportioned has been raising concerns on an international level and has, therefore, become the subject of an EU Commission report. Currently, the international auditing market is heavily dominated by the big four accounting firms and several barriers of entry exist to prevent mid sized firms entering the market. Many of the barriers result directly from the fact that auditors are jointly and severally liable for misstatements in the financial accounts. Therefore, due to their deep pockets, auditors are often the main target for those taking actions against struggling companies[9]. Based on this position, the EU Commission looked into the option of establishing a cap on liability (either statutorily or through contractual provisions). After careful consideration of all of the options, it was felt that a principle of proportionality would be the best approach, given all of the issues raised. It was concluded that proportionality would reduce the deep pockets issue, yet would still ensure that the level of quality of auditing work is maintained. This level of proportionality should not be cast in stone and should be established on a case by case basis. It is anticipated that this will provide sufficient security for the smaller auditors to compete on a level playing field with the domain that has traditionally been that of the big four firms. Bibliography Allen, Robert D., Hermanson, Dana R., Kozloski, Thomas M., Ramsay, Robert J., Auditor Risk Assessment: Insights from the Academic Literature, Accounting Horizons, 20, 2006 Clarke, Frank L., Dean, G.W., Oliver, Kyle Gaius, Corporate Collapse: Accounting, Regulatory and Ethical Failure, Cambridge University Press, 2003 Garner, Don E., McKee, David L., McKee, Yosra AbuAmara, Accounting and the Global Economy After Sarbanes-Oxley, M.E. Sharpe, 2008 Hay, David, Davis, David, The Voluntary Choice of an Auditor of Any Level of Quality, Auditing: A Journal of Practice Theory, 23, 2004 Hillison, William, Pacini, Carl, Auditor Reputation and the Insurance Hypothesis: The Information Content of Disclosures of Financial Distress of a Major Accounting Firm, Journal of Managerial Issues, 16, 2004 Pacini, Carl, Hillison, William, Sinason, David, Auditor liability to third parties: an international focus, Managerial Auditing Journal, 15, 8, 2000 Pong, C.K.M., Burnett, S., The implications of merger for market share, audit pricing and non-audit fee income: The case of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Managerial Auditing Journal, 21, 1, 2006 Smith, Roy C., Walter, Ingo, Governing the Modern Corporation: Capital Markets, Corporate Control, and Economic Performance, Oxford University Press US, 2006 Soltani, Bahram, Auditing: An International Approach, Pearson Education, 2007 Footnotes [1] Pong, C.K.M., Burnett, S., The implications of merger for market share, audit pricing and non-audit fee income: The case of PricewaterhouseCoopers. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21, 1, 2006 [2] Clarke, Frank L., Dean, G. W., Oliver, Kyle Gaius, Corporate Collapse: Accounting, Regulatory and Ethical Failure, Cambridge University Press, 2003 [3] Soltani, Bahram Auditing, An International Approach, Pearson Education, 2007 [4] Hillison, William, Pacini, Carl, Auditor Reputation and the Insurance Hypothesis: The Information Content of Disclosures of Financial Distress of a Major Accounting Firm, Journal of Managerial Issues, 16, 2004 [5] Pacini, Carl, Hillison, William, Sinason, David, Auditor liability to third parties: an international focus, Managerial Auditing Journal, 15, 8, 2000 [6] Garner, Don E., McKee, David L., McKee, Yosra AbuAmara, Accounting and the Global Economy After Sarbanes-Oxley, M.E. Sharpe, 2008 [7] Hay, David, Davis, David, The Voluntary Choice of an Auditor of Any Level of Quality, Auditing: A Journal of Practice Theory, 23, 2004 [8] Smith, Roy C., Walter, Ingo, Governing the Modern Corporation: Capital Markets, Corporate Control, and Economic Performance, Oxford University Press US, 2006 [9] Allen, Robert D., Hermanson, Thomas, Dana R., Kozloski, M., Ramsay, Robert J., Auditor Risk Assessment: Insights from the Academic Literature, Accounting Horizons, 20, 2006

Competency Goal Essay

Functional Area #1 – Safe: In order to provide a safe environment and teach children safe practices to prevent and reduce injuries I do the following: †¢I always do my classroom counts every 30 minutes, or more often when necessary, to make sure that my head count matches the actual number of children in my classroom. †¢Our centers are set up to reduce open floor space and the opportunity to run freely indoors †¢I check all toys and equipment for broken or missing parts often to ensure they remain safe for use and play. †¢I ensure that all chemicals and cleaning supplies are put away out of the reach of children or stored in locked cabinets to prevent injury or poisoning. †¢I keep my emergency routes posted and easily visible and my emergency contacts are always with me in a binder and easily accessible. †¢I am trained in emergency evacuation procedures and plans to remove all children from the classroom and/or building in the event of a tornado or fire †¢I am certified in First Aid, CPR, and Pediatric First Aid which makes me knowledgeable of caring for accidents or injuries. Functional Area #2 – Healthy: In order to provide an environment that promotes health and prevents illness, and teaches children about good nutrition and practices that promote Wellness, I do the following: †¢Cleaning and sanitizing classroom items, including future & toys, a task done multiple times a day. I sanitize all toys immediately after being put into a child’s mouth, to prevent the spread of germs. †¢ I wash my hands & wear gloves before & after handling food, helping with toileting, cleaning noses to prevent germs from being spread. †¢ I follow the center’s policies for sick children to prevent other illnesses in the classroom. †¢We also serve Healthy Balanced meals breakfast, lunch & snack. Functional Area #3 – Learning Environment: In order to use relationships, the physical space, materials, daily schedule, and routines to create a secure, interesting, and enjoyable environment that promotes engagement, play exploration, and learning of all children including children with disabilities and special needs, I do the following: †¢I have made sure that all Centers are laid out to help Children better benefit in learning. By putting the quite, busy & messy centers together. †¢We also have an ABC carpet that’s just for group time. Limit 10 to 15mins †¢I have put out many different learning activities for each center. Reading has lots of books, writing has name cards & letter strips, Dramatic Play & table toys has theme related items. Blocks have cars, animals, dollhouse & furniture. Science has Theme related items & Art I put out different things weekly to keep the Creativity going. †¢Also during the day we have group time twice, free time, small groups twice, outdoor play twice when weather permits & nap.

Examining Christian Symbolism in “A White Heron” Essay

Symbolism is a very prominent attribute contained within Sarah Orne Jewett’s short story, â€Å"A White Heron†. The short story takes its reader through the short exploration that the main character, Sylvia, goes through when she is faced with making a decision that may lead to the end of a beautiful bird’s life. Many critics have analyzed and debated the many symbols contained within the story. Victoria Freivogel, an English teacher from Louisiana, wrote an essay which examines what she considers the symbolism to be in â€Å"A White Heron†. In her essay she goes against other critics who claim â€Å"the ornithologist, pine tree, and white heron are symbolic of Sylvia’s burgeoning sexuality† (Freivogel 136). In fact she states, â€Å"they are, in fact, symbols of Christianity† (Freivogel 136). Innocence in â€Å"The White Heron† is a theme that I, as a reader, have recognized each time I have read the story. Reading Freivogelâ⠂¬â„¢s essay and learning about other critic’s views can be a little unsettling when the reader has only viewed the story as an innocent journey of a young girl who decides to protect nature, as well as her own conscious. Freivogel reveals that, â€Å"Many critics liken the ornithologist to a sexual predator† (Freivogel 136). These critics consider him a predator because he is offering her money for compensation if she can lead him to the white heron which is symbolic of a â€Å"sexual predator convincing Sylvia to hunt for the white heron with him† (Freivogel 136). She goes on to say that these critics consider the â€Å"hunt for birds equal to a hunt for Sylvia’s sexual being† (Freivogel 137). In reality, the hunt is simply for the bird and innocence remains prominent, which is shown when Jewett writes that Sylvia, â€Å"could not understand why he killed the very birds he seemed to like so much† (Jewett 67). A clear symbol in â€Å"A White Heron† is the hunter who symbolizes an enemy; the enemy against nature and and the enemy against Sylvia possibly going against her better judgment. Freivogel considers the symbol of an enemy to be symbolic of Satan. Other critics also view the enemy as Satan. Freivogel points out that the hunter from first appearances, â€Å"is charming, sly, and observant of Sylvia’s weakness† (Freivogel 138). These qualities are said to be the same of Satan in the Garden of Eden, and the hunter is preying on Sylvia, as Satan preyed on Eve. However, he is preying on her weakness in order for him to have the satisfaction of hunting down the white heron, not preying on her in a sexual  manner. Another inept image that some critics maintain is that the pine tree that Sylvia climbs is â€Å"sexually symbolic† (Freivogel 138).   The passage, â€Å"The tree seemed to lengthen itself out as she went up, and to reach farther and farther upward† (Jewett 69), Richard Benzo wrote that â€Å"there is a sexual relationship indicated by this passage† and that â€Å"Sylvia I somehow trying to overcome a fear of sexual relations† (qtd. in Freivogel 138). This sexual claim about the pine tree is said to be â€Å"too obvious, and facile† by Freivogel. These critics who maintain that this story has a sexual theme do not see innocence involved in this story at all. The tree is actually a Christian symbol that reminds believers to â€Å"seek out heavenly treasures, rather than earthly treasures† (qtd. in Freivogel 139), and this is what Sylvia does by choosing to not let the hunter know where to find the white heron. Lastly, the white heron is also seen as a symbol of sexuality by other critics. Freivogel writes that another critic, Elizabeth Ammons, argues that the heron is symbolic â€Å"of Sylvia’s body that she must offer up as ‘prey’ to the ornithologist in exchange for ‘money, social approval, and affection† (qtd. In Freivogel 140). In reality Jewett wrote nothing to indicate that the hunter was trying to â€Å"prey† on Sylvia in a sexual way. However, he was preying on her innocence by tempting her with a money reward for informing him of the white heron’s location. Freivogel rebukes these critic’s viewpoints on the heron being sexually symbolic. She even goes so far to say, â€Å"the idea of the heron as a sexual symbol seems the most far-fetched† (Freivogel 140). Birds are symbolic in the Christian church. They are said to be â€Å"symbolic of Christ† and â€Å"images of the eternal struggle of good and evil and of Christ’s battle against the devil† (qtd. in Freivogel 140). Sylvia encompasses all of these throughout her journey to find the heron, and into her decision to keep its location a secret. Many critics base their analyses on â€Å"A White Heron† on sexual nuances as the symbolism of the story. Freivogel affirms that it is a story â€Å"filled with symbols that are common to Christian beliefs† (Freivogel 141). Sylvia has overcome the temptations offered to her by the hunter or â€Å"satan†, and reached the top of the pine tree where she realizes the true treasures come from the heavens, and she could not betray that for â€Å"earthly treasures† brought by the money. Ultimately, Sylvia won the battle of good versus evil. Victoria Freivogel’s views on symbolism capture the true essence of  the story, which I believe to be pure innocence. Christian symbolism throughout the story cements the purity of nature and even of the young Sylvia. Sylvia is only a nine year old girl. Many of her views will be highly influenced by others, but she has the purest mind and heart, and she listened to the voices of nature, as well as her inner conscience when deciding that she could not tell the whereabouts of the white heron. I find the sexual symbolism believed by other critics to be senseless. Those impure views take away the purity of the theme, and it completely changes the meaning of the story. I will always read â€Å"The White Heron† as a story of a young girl who shows remarkable fearlessness in her journey to find the heron and in her journey she discovers how precious all life truly is. . Works Cited Freivogel, Victoria. â€Å"Christian Symbolism In Sarah Orne Jewett’s ‘A White Heron’.† Eureka Studies In Teaching Short Fiction 7.2 (2007): 136-142. MLA International Bibliography. Web. 5 Dec. 2012. Jewett, Sarah Orne. â€Å"A White Heron.† Literature: A Pocket Anthology. Ed. R.S. Gwynn. 5th ed. Boston: Pearson Education, 2012. 62-71. Print.

Baby Boom History

The dramatic increase in the number of births from 1946 to 1964 in the United States (1947 to 1966 in Canada and 1946 to 1961 in Australia) is called the Baby Boom. It was caused by young males who, upon returning to the United States, Canada, and Australia following tours of duty overseas during World War II, began families; this brought about a significant number of new children into the world. The Beginning of the Baby Boom In the 1930s to early 1940s, new births in the United States averaged around 2.3 to 2.8 million each year. In 1946, the first year of the Baby Boom, new births in the U.S. skyrocketed to 3.47 million births! New births continued to grow throughout the 1940s and 1950s, leading to a peak in the late 1950s with 4.3 million births in 1957 and 1961. (There was a dip to 4.2 million births in 1958) By the mid-sixties, the birth rate began to slowly fall. In 1964 (the final year of the Baby Boom), 4 million babies were born in the U.S. and in 1965, there was a significant drop to 3.76 million births. From 1965 on, there was a plunge in the number of births to a low of 3.14 million births in 1973, lower than any year’s births since 1945. Life of a Baby Boomer In the United States, approximately 79 million babies were born during the Baby Boom. Much of this cohort of nineteen years (1946-1964) grew up with Woodstock, the Vietnam War, and John F. Kennedy as president. In 2006, the oldest Baby Boomers turned 60 years old, including the first two Baby Boomer presidents, Presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush, both born in the first year of the Baby Boom, 1946. Dropping Birth Rate After 1964 From 1973 on, Generation X was nowhere near as populous as their parents. The total births rose to 3.6 million in 1980 and then 4.16 million in 1990. For 1990 on, the number of births has remained somewhat constant – from 2000 to now, the birth rate has hovered at 4 million annually. It’s amazing that 1957 and 1961 are the peak birth years in raw number of births for the nation even though the total national population was 60% of the current population. Obviously, the birth rate among Americans has dropped precipitously. The birth rate per 1000 population in 1957 was 25.3. In 1973, it was 14.8. The birth rate per 1000 rose to 16.7 in 1990 but today has dropped to 14. Affect on Economy The dramatic increase in births during the Baby Boom helped to lead to exponential rises in the demand for consumer products, suburban homes, automobiles, roads, and services. Demographer P.K. Whelpton forecast this demand, as quoted in the August 9, 1948 edition of Newsweek. When the number of persons is rising rapidly it is necessary to prepare for the increase. Houses and apartments must be built; streets must be paved; power, light, water, and sewer systems must be extended; existing factories, stores and other business structures must be enlarged or new ones erected; and much machinery must be manufactured. And that’s exactly what happened. The metropolitan areas of the United States exploded in growth and led to huge suburban developments, such as Levittown. The table below displays the total number of births for each year indicated from 1930 through 2007 in the United States. Notice the increase in births during the Baby Boom from 1946 to 1964. The source for this data are numerous editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States. U.S. Births 1930-2007 Year Births 1930 2.2 million 1933 2.31 million 1935 2.15 million 1940 2.36 million 1941 2.5 million 1942 2.8 million 1943 2.9 million 1944 2.8 million 1945 2.8 million 1946 3.47 million 1947 3.9 million 1948 3.5 million 1949 3.56 million 1950 3.6 million 1951 3.75 million 1952 3.85 million 1953 3.9 million 1954 4 million 1955 4.1 million 1956 4.16 million 1957 4.3 million 1958 4.2 million 1959 4.25 million 1960 4.26 million 1961 4.3 million 1962 4.17 million 1963 4.1 million 1964 4 million 1965 3.76 million 1966 3.6 million 1967 3.5 million 1973 3.14 million 1980 3.6 million 1985 3.76 million 1990 4.16 million 1995 3.9 million 2000 4 million 2004 4.1 million 2007 4.317 million The table below displays the total number of births for each year indicated from 1930 through 2007 in the United States. Notice the increase in births during the Baby Boom from 1946 to 1964. The source for this data are numerous editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States. U.S. Births 1930-2007 Year Births 1930 2.2 million 1933 2.31 million 1935 2.15 million 1940 2.36 million 1941 2.5 million 1942 2.8 million 1943 2.9 million 1944 2.8 million 1945 2.8 million 1946 3.47 million 1947 3.9 million 1948 3.5 million 1949 3.56 million 1950 3.6 million 1951 3.75 million 1952 3.85 million 1953 3.9 million 1954 4 million 1955 4.1 million 1956 4.16 million 1957 4.3 million 1958 4.2 million 1959 4.25 million 1960 4.26 million 1961 4.3 million 1962 4.17 million 1963 4.1 million 1964 4 million 1965 3.76 million 1966 3.6 million 1967 3.5 million 1973 3.14 million 1980 3.6 million 1985 3.76 million 1990 4.16 million 1995 3.9 million 2000 4 million 2004 4.1 million 2007 4.317 million